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RESPONSE 
 
ONE MARKET WE DO NOT NEED 
GIOVANNA SHAY † 
In response to Alexander Volokh, Prison Vouchers, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. 779 (2012).  
 
Professor Volokh is right that American prisons are considered to be 
“low quality,” and that they suffer from “high violence rates, bad medi-
cal care, [and] overuse of highly punitive measures like administrative 
segregation . . . .”1  But his proposed solution—a system of “prison 
vouchers” that would permit prisoners to choose their facilities and thus 
create a market for prison services—would provide only an illusion of 
choice.  Even worse, such a system runs the risk of strengthening the 
self-interested forces that drive our overgrown system of incarceration.   
I commend Professor Volokh for drawing attention to the problem 
of abysmal prison conditions and for making the important, and too 
often ignored, point that “bad prison conditions often indirectly hurt 
the rest of society.”2  And I thank him for creating the opportunity for 
a thoughtful exchange about these critical issues.  However, his pro-
posal—though fascinating—is flawed. 
It is easy to quibble with the specifics of Professor Volokh’s proposal 
and to suggest ways in which it will not work.  In the piece, he identifies 
and counters some of the critiques that I will expand on in this brief 
 
†
Associate Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law.  
Thanks to James Forman, Jr., for helpful comments. 
1 Alexander Volokh, Prison Vouchers, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 779, 784 (2012). 
2 Id. at 784-85; see also James Forman, Jr., Why Care About Mass Incarceration?, 108 
MICH. L. REV. 993, 1004 (2010) (book review); Giovanna Shay, Ad Law Incarcerated, 14 
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 329, 352-61 (2009) (describing the impact of prison policies on 
prisoners’ families and communities). 
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Response.  But the central problem of the proposal is not the possibility 
of “market failure” or “market success.”3  Fundamentally, what makes 
me uneasy about Professor Volokh’s proposal is that it reinforces a mar-
ket mindset toward prisons and the people that they contain.   
In their book Priceless:  On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value 
of Nothing, Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling argue that economic 
analysis is not appropriate for every policy choice.4  Some decisions 
should be made “on the basis of rights and principles,”5 and some 
goods, like human life, are “priceless.”6  To be sure, Professor Volokh is 
not suggesting that prisoners bid to obtain minimum conditions or es-
sential medical care.  However, his proposed voucher system, rooted in 
a faith in markets, takes us one step closer to such a world. 
Moreover—and this is really my greatest concern—if markets are 
successful, they can grow.  And I fear that embracing a market mental-
ity in this area will contribute to the one thing that America really 
does not need now:  more growth in our system of prisons.  Professor 
Volokh does a good job of outlining the problems with conditions in 
American prisons.  But he does not acknowledge the primary condition 
afflicting American incarceration.  That problem has been analogized 
to obesity:  the system is just too big.7 
It has become almost trite to talk about the unprecedented scale of 
American incarceration.  At 2.3 million prisoners, our nation has the 
largest absolute number of incarcerated people, and the highest in-
carceration rate, in the world.8  Commentators across the ideological 
spectrum, from Angela Y. Davis9 to Justice Kennedy10 to Newt Gin-
 
3 Volokh, supra note 1, at 792. 
4 FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS:  ON KNOWING THE 
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 234 (2004). 
5 Id. at 213. 
6 Id. at 8. 
7 See Jonathan Simon, How Should We Punish Murder?, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1241, 1251 
(2011) (“Just as obesity can mean that a person has lost the ability to regulate their own 
appetite for food, mass incarceration is evidence that our collective appetite  
for punishment is out of whack.”). 
8 See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100:  BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008, at 5 
(2008), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/report/report_detail. 
aspx?id=35904 (listing the number of prisoners under correctional supervisi 
on in jails and prisons in 2009). 
9 See ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 105-06 (2003) (claiming that the cur-
rent criminal justice system has an “exaggerated dependence on imprisonment”). 
10 See Carol J. Williams, Justice Kennedy Laments the State of Prisons in California, U.S., 
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2010, at AA5 (reporting Justice Kennedy’s disapproval of  
excessive incarceration in California). 
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grich,11 have decried this overreliance on incarceration.  In the cur-
rent economic crisis, this level of incarceration cannot continue.  That 
is why so many jurisdictions, including some that are notoriously 
“tough on crime,” such as Texas, have adopted measures to curb their 
use of incarceration without compromising public safety.12  There are 
signs that these measures are working to decrease the growth of the 
prison population.  The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) recently re-
leased a report explaining that the number of incarcerated people in 
the United States fell in 2010 for the first time since 1972.13 
At what could be a critical turning point, I fear that Professor Vo-
lokh’s proposal could kick-start prison growth.  Although we cannot 
say for sure what would happen if a system of “prison vouchers” were 
adopted, there is reason to believe that it could unleash some power-
ful forces.  The notion of vouchers for prisoners further normalizes 
the idea that corrections is a market and that prisoners are a commod-
ity.14  It also creates yet another opening for powerful lobbies with 
vested economic interests, such as private corrections companies and 
guards’ unions, to advocate policies that promote incarceration.15 
 
11 See Statement on Principles, RIGHT ON CRIME, http://www.rightoncrime.com/the-
conservative-case-for-reform/statement-of-principles (last visited Feb. 15, 2012) (declar-
ing that government spending on the criminal justice system and incarceration should 
be limited, and bearing Newt Gingrich’s signature). 
12  See AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (ACLU), SMART REFORM IS POSSIBLE:  
STATES REDUCING INCARCERATION RATES AND COSTS WHILE PROTECTING COM-
MUNITIES 5 (2011) (describing the trend away from incarceration among historically 
“tough on crime” states because of increased concern for fiscal responsibility in the 
wake of the economic crisis); Charlie Savage, Trend to Lighten Harsh Sentences Catches On 
in Conservative States, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2011, at A14 (same). 
13 See PAUL GUERINO ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2010, 
at 1 (2011) (describing the 0.6% drop in number of prisoners under state  
and federal jurisdiction in 2010). 
14 Commentators criticizing prison privatization have identified the “commodi-
fication” of prisoners as one concern.  See, e.g., Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc:  The 
Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. 
REV. 879, 963-70 & n.308 (2004). 
15 See Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 532-33 
(2005) (describing the power of prison guard unions as a political lobby for incarcera-
tion); James Forman, Jr., The Black Poor, Black Elites, and America’s Prisons, 32 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 791, 799-800 (2011) (describing the influence of the Washington, D.C. corrections 
officers’ union in opposing prison reforms); Marie Gottschalk, Cell Blocks & Red Ink:  
Mass Incarceration, the Great Recession & Penal Reform, DAEDALUS, Summer 2010, at 62, 67 
(warning that the recession may not produce lasting reductions in prison populations 
because of entrenched interests).  See generally ACLU, BANKING ON BONDAGE:  PRIVATE 
PRISONS AND MASS INCARCERATION 38 (2011) (describing the “private prison lobby”).   
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Professor Volokh takes great pains to point out that he is not advo-
cating prison privatization per se.16  I can understand why he is eager 
to distance his proposal from private prisons, since conditions in some 
of them—like conditions in many government facilities—have been 
roundly criticized.  For example, a recent report by the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) describes conditions in a Texas youth facility 
run by a private prison company, the GEO Group, as “horrid.”17  In-
dependent auditors sent to monitor the juvenile facility reportedly 
“got so much fecal matter on their shoes they had to wipe their 
feet on the grass outside.”18  Another new report by the Sentencing 
Project catalogues hundreds of brutality complaints at a  
Mississippi youth facility that is run by the GEO Group and under  
federal investigation, as well as disturbing reports of staff sexual abuse 
at a Kentucky Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) facility  
housing female prisoners from Hawaii.19   
There is also a troubling “revolving door” between government 
and private corrections.20  In one high-profile instance, former Bureau 
of Prisons Director Harley Lappin left government service after being 
arrested for alleged drunk driving in 2011; soon afterwards, he began 
working as CCA’s Chief Corrections Officer.21 
But a “prison vouchers” system can only promote privatization, by 
opening yet more arenas in which corrections companies will push to 
compete.22  Recent studies have shown how private corrections com-
panies contribute to the growth of incarceration in the United States 
by advocating policies that promote prisons.23  Detention Watch Net-
work released a report stating that CCA spent more than eighteen mil-
lion dollars on lobbying between 1999 and 2009.24  Private prison 
 
16 See Volokh, supra note 1, at 803-05. 
17 See ACLU, supra note 15, at 37. 
18 Id. (quoting Doug J. Swanson, TYC Investigates Staff for Ties to Jail Operator, DALL. 
MORNING NEWS, Oct. 6, 2007, at 1A). 
19 CODY MASON, SENTENCING PROJECT, TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE:  PRIVATE PRISONS 
IN AMERICA 11 (2012). 
20 See ACLU, supra note 15, at 36. 
21 Id. 
22 See MASON, supra note 19, at 16 (“[P]rivate prison companies use their influence 
to increase profits by taking advantage of and continuing the nation’s long- 
standing reliance on incarceration.”). 
23 See, e.g., ACLU, supra note 15, at 32; see also James Ridgeway, Locking Up Profits, 
AL JAZEERA (Nov. 28, 2011, 11:52 AM), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/ 
opinion/2011/11/20111127105458655442.html (describing three studies on private 
prison companies, including reports by the ACLU and Detention Watch Network). 
24 DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, THE INFLUENCE OF THE PRIVATE PRISON 
INDUSTRY IN THE IMMIGRATION DETENTION BUSINESS 3 (2011), available at 
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companies make political contributions as well—according to the Sen-
tencing Project, “an average of over $430,000 per election cycle, with 
nearly 70 percent going toward Republican candidates.”25  CCA lobby-
ists have even drafted laws to promote more draconian immigration 
policies and enforcement in order to expand the pool of Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement detainees.26  The American Legislative Ex-
change Coalition, which reportedly includes CCA and Wackenhut 
among its members, has been described as “the most powerful lobby 
you’ve never heard of,”27 sponsoring so-called “truth-in-sentencing” 
reforms, which have produced longer sentences in some forty states.28  
It is not only private corrections companies that are invested in ex-
panding the market in prisoners.  Guards’ unions, such as the Califor-
nia Correctional and Peace Officers Association (CCPOA), also lobby 
for harsher sentences.29  In a speech to Los Angeles lawyers, Justice 
Kennedy lamented the fact that the corrections officers union was the 
sponsor of California’s three-strikes law, saying, “that is sick!”30   
Creating an even more explicit market in prisoners through prison 
vouchers can only compound these troubling trends.  Professor Vo-
lokh might counter that his proposal at least will improve conditions 
by permitting inmates to vote as to the most humane prisons by exer-
cising choice.31  But getting accurate information about conditions on 
the ground in any prison facility is truly daunting.   
In describing the problems of America’s prisons, Professor Vo-
lokh’s paper cites the report of the Commission on Safety and Abuse 
in America’s Prisons,32 a commission convened by the Vera Institute 
and composed of corrections experts.  Although the commission’s 
report commends the BJS’s data collection efforts, it also acknowledg-
es that there simply is no information available about many aspects of 
 
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/detentionwatchnetwork.org/files/
PrivatePrisonPDF-FINAL%205-11-11.pdf. 
25 MASON, supra note 19, at 15. 
26 See DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, supra note 24, at 3. 
27 Dolovich, supra note 15, at 523, 526 (citing Nick Penniman, Outing ALEC:  The 
Most Powerful Lobby You’ve Never Heard Of, AM. PROSPECT, July 1, 2002, at 12). 
28 Id. at 527; MASON, supra note 19, at 13 (describing how private prison compa-
nies were involved in the drafting of model legislation, including “mandatory mini-
mum sentences, three strikes laws, and truth-in-sentencing, all of which  
contribute to higher prison populations”). 
29 Dolovich, supra note 15, at 530-31. 
30 See Williams, supra note 10, at AA5. 
31 See Volokh, supra note 1, at 784 (arguing that inmates “would become consumers 
and thus drive reform by voting with [their] feet”). 
32 Id. at 785 n.18. 
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prison life.33  The report quotes the BJS chief statistician, Allen Beck, 
as saying, “The level of assaults is simply not known.  I cannot measure 
well the level of assault using administrative records as they exist to-
day.”34  Nationwide statistics on prison sexual violence were not even 
collected until 2004, when the first survey was conducted as a result of 
the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003.35 
Professor Volokh suggests that prison operators could publicize in-
formation regarding their facilities.36  This response mistakes advertis-
ing for accurate information.  Private prison companies have 
marketing departments that churn out only positive stories and Inter-
net sites.37  As the ACLU points out, “no one would know from CCA’s 
website that one of its employees sexually abused multiple female im-
migration detainees, or that one of its facilities is allegedly so violent 
that it has been dubbed the ‘gladiator school.’”38  Private prison com-
panies may be exempt from information-sharing mechanisms such as 
the Freedom of Information Act and some state records laws.39  CCA 
has—unsuccessfully—resisted a request to turn over settlement docu-
ments and complaints to the leading publication for prisoner rights, 
Prison Legal News.40  Some private prison companies have even sought 
to thwart efforts by their shareholders to obtain information about 
issues such as political contributions.41 
Professor Volokh suggests that defendants could seek information 
regarding prisons from “friends or neighbors who have been in prison,” 
or from their defense lawyers.42  If a defendant’s friends are incarcer-
ated, then their phone calls and letters almost certainly will be moni-
tored by censors.43  If the defendant’s friends have been released, then 
their information will be dated.  Moreover, former inmates’ perspec-
 
33 See COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, CONFRONTING 
CONFINEMENT 24 (2006) (“BJS has made significant progress in improving the  
validity, reliability, and comprehensiveness of the data on violence, but there are still 
 significant weaknesses and blind spots.”). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 See Volokh, supra note 1, at 830. 
37 See ACLU, supra note 15, at 40. 
38 Id. at 40-41. 
39 Id. at 41. 
40 Judge Favors Plaintiff in Private Prison Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 1, 2011, available 
at http://www.canadianbusiness.com/article/59923. 
41 See ACLU, supra note 15, at 41 (describing a shareholder proposal that CCA de-
feated, which would have required more transparency about political contributions). 
42 Volokh, supra note 1, at 830. 
43 See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 574-77 (1974) (upholding a prison regula-
tion monitoring prisoners’ legal mail for contraband). 
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tives necessarily will be anecdotal and limited to the facilities where they 
were incarcerated, with little aggregate data or basis for comparison. 
If there is one factor that is readily apparent to prisoners, it is loca-
tion.  Paul Wright, editor of Prison Legal News, suggests that prisoners 
will have strong opinions that the best prisons for them will be the 
ones closest to home, so that they can get visitors.44  However, this 
suggests that, in a voucher system, there would be long waiting lists 
for the facilities closest to large population centers—a far cry  
from a system in which prisoner choice drives improvements in con-
ditions and programmatic offerings.  Professor Volokh might coun-
ter that prisoner preference for proximity to home would create a 
push for more prisons to be built near cities.  But given the major  
investment required to build new prisons, and higher land values 
near cities,45 it could be a long wait.  
As for defense counsel, they usually are not able to gain  
access to facilities to evaluate whether their marketing claims are  
accurate.  Even if counsel could tour prisons, attorneys may  
lack the professional skills to evaluate critical functions such as  
health care. 46  Moreover, indigent defense systems in many parts  
of the country are overwhelmed and underresourced.47  Relying on 
defense lawyers to evaluate competing claims regarding prison  
conditions is overly optimistic at best. 
Professor Volokh argues that prisoners’ decisions to transfer be-
tween facilities will serve as an effective mechanism for exercising 
prisoner choice.48  But the information barriers for would-be lateral 
transfers are too high for this mechanism to work smoothly.  Prison 
 
44 Email from Paul Wright, Editor, Prison Legal News, to author (Dec. 6, 2011) (on 
file with the author). 
45 Cf. Stephen C. Fehr, New Motive for Springing Lorton Site:  Valuable Real Estate Tied 
Up at District’s Prison Complex, WASH. POST, June 13, 1996, at B1 (describing how,  
as Fairfax County became more populous, officials and developers began to consider 
closing a Washington D.C. prison in the northern Virginia suburbs because of the 
 site’s “development potential”). 
46 See Margo Schlanger et al., ABA Criminal Justice Standards on the Treatment of Pris-
oners, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2010, at 14, 16-17 (recognizing that the bar has an im-
portant but necessarily limited role to play in improving conditions of confinement). 
47 See AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFEND-
ANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE:  AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL 
JUSTICE 7-14 (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel
_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf (describing specific problems defense 
counsel for indigent clients face, including lack of funding and essential resources, 
such as expert, investigative, and support services). 
48 See Volokh, supra note 1, at 819-23. 
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regulations typically forbid prisoners from corresponding with in-
mates at other facilities for security reasons.49  Prisoners may lack ac-
cess to the Internet and may encounter difficulty in receiving 
publications, or in keeping certain amounts of printed material in 
their cells.50  For example, Prison Legal News is censored in numerous 
states.51  To be sure, a correctional facility might have an incentive to 
keep information about competitors from reaching its residents.   
There are also larger structural issues that could inhibit the use of 
prisoner choice as a means of shaping corrections services.  Although 
Professor Volokh’s proposal is not fully identified with privatization, we 
can look to the current private prisons system to anticipate potential 
problems in a market created by prisoners’ vouchers.  Professor Richard 
Culp of the John Jay College of Criminal Justice recently has comment-
ed that the private prisons market is an “oligopoly” in which four com-
panies possess ninety-two percent of the market share.52  He writes that 
an oligopoly “is characterized by interdependence, avoidance of compe-
tition and a rigid attachment to the status quo among the leading 
firms”53—hardly a recipe for competence,54 let alone innovation.55 
Finally, there is the problem of prisoner choice.  Researchers have 
contended that choice is constrained even in free-world contexts, such 
as school choice.56  I find it particularly unsatisfying to talk about 
 
49 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91 (1987) (upholding a prison regulation pro-
hibiting correspondence between inmates at different institutions). 
50 See Gabriel Arkles, Correcting Race and Gender:  Prison Regulation of Social Hierarchy 
Through Dress, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2012) (“In my experience of 
communicating with imprisoned people who sought to comment on proposed Nation-
al Prison Rape Elimination Commission standards, I found that some prisons would 
not allow the full standards into the jail, at times objecting that they were ‘too long.’”). 
51 For a map of states in which Prison Legal News has litigated for access, see PLN in 
Action, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/plnmap.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2012).   
52 Richard Culp, The Failed Promise of Prison Privatization, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 
2011, at 1, 4; see also MASON, supra note 19, at 2 (reporting that CCA and the GEO 
Group “manage over half of the [private corrections] contracts in the United States, 
[resulting in] combined revenues exceeding $2.9 billion in 2010”). 
53 Culp, supra note 52, at 3. 
54 See Dora Schriro, Improving Conditions of Confinement for Criminal Inmates and Im-
migrant Detainees, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1441, 1447-48 (2010) (identifying three key 
organizational characteristics for safe conditions of confinement:  “capacity, compe-
tency, and commitment”). 
55 See Culp, supra note 52, at 1-3. 
56 See Susan L. DeJarnatt, School Choice and the (Ir)rational Parent, 15 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 38 (2008) (discussing studies showing that, in choosing among 
schools, parents “rely on their existing social networks,” and that parents’ perception 
of their available choices is determined in large part by their social class). 
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choice in the context of a criminal punishment system that is inher-
ently coercive and that is marked by persistent, systemic racial and so-
cioeconomic disparity. 57   How are prisoners to exercise choice 
effectively when their attempts to notify authorities of systemic wrong-
doing meet with mockery58 or retaliation?59  How are they to do so 
when they are illiterate,60 or possess limited proficiency in English?61  
Is choice a realistic concept for the prisoners who have mental illness-
es, estimated to be more than fifty percent of inmates?62  How about 
for those who are held in segregation?63  Prof. Volokh argues that 
"[t]he inmate's family or an appointed legal guardian could make the 
choice,"64 but this does not address the barriers that non-prisoners 
face in obtaining accurate information regarding conditions on-the-
ground in corrections facilities.  Prisoners are not consumers shop-
ping for home mortgages (although we also could debate  
whether that market worked).  They are the dispossessed of our socie-
ty, held in situations designed to minimize their access to  
information and their exercise of autonomy. 
The report of the Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s 
Prisons proposes a different solution to the problem of poor prison 
 
57 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:  MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 2 (2010) (contending that discrimination that was 
once directed toward African-Americans is now directed toward “criminal,” who are 
disproportionately African-American); Forman, supra note 15, at 795 (arguing that 
middle class African-Americans should consider ways in which they are also invested in 
the criminal punishment status quo). 
58 See Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 531 n.20 (5th Cir. 2004) (explaining that, 
upon reporting repeated rapes, Roderick Johnson was informed by prison authorities, 
“[w]e don’t protect punks on this farm”). 
59 See Everson v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 391 F.3d 737, 742-43 (6th Cir. 2004) (describ-
ing systemic sexual abuse and harassment of prisoners, followed by widespread retalia-
tion against those who reported wrongdoing). 
60 See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, LITERACY BEHIND PRISON WALLS:  
PROFILES OF THE PRISON POPULATION FROM THE NATIONAL ADULT LITERACY 
SURVEY 31 (1994) (observing that sixty-eight percent of prisoners performed at the 
lowest two levels on the prose literacy scale). 
61 See id. at 45 (observing that eleven percent of prisoners report coming from a 
household in which only a language other than English was spoken, while nine percent 
report growing up in a house in which both English and another language were spoken). 
62 DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MEN-
TAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006). 
63 See Margo Schlanger, Regulating Segregation:  The Contribution of the ABA Criminal Jus-
tice Standards on the Treatment of Prisoners, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1421, 1432-33 (2010) (de-
scribing harms of long-term segregation, including physical and mental deterioration). 
64 Volokh, supra note 1, at 801. 
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conditions—external monitoring.65  This is a measure adopted by 
some other mature democracies, including the United Kingdom and 
Sweden,66 and advocated by the American Bar Association (ABA).67    
However, the reform that I would prioritize is simpler—fewer pris-
oners.  The greatest inhumanity of our current system is its sprawling 
size, producing crushing overcrowding in some systems,68 and multi-
plying its effects on families and communities on a scale that  
is hard to fathom.69  The ABA is working on a state policy initiative 
designed to reduce states’ reliance on incarceration.70  The ABA advo-
cates measures that have been demonstrated to safeguard public safety 
while reducing prison populations, such as pretrial detention reform, 
decriminalization of low-level offenses, use of community  
corrections, and changes to parole.71  
Just when it seems that the United States may be turning a corner, 
Professor Volokh’s “prison vouchers” proposal runs the risk of rein-
forcing entrenched interests that have contributed to prison expan-
sion.  This is one market that we do not need. 
 
 
 
 
 
65 See COMM’N ON SAFETY AND ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 33, at 
16 (“Every U.S. prison and jail should be monitored by an independent government 
body, sufficiently empowered and funded to regularly inspect conditions of confine-
ment and report findings to lawmakers and the public.”). 
66 See SILJA J.A. TALVI, WOMEN BEHIND BARS:  THE CRISIS OF WOMEN IN THE 
U.S. PRISON SYSTEM 236 (2007) (describing the role of Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector 
of Prisons in the United Kingdom); Michele Deitch, Special Populations and the Im-
portance of Prison Oversight, 37 AM. J. CRIM. L. 291, 304-05, 308-09 (2010) (describing 
the British Prison Inspectorate and the Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsman).  
67 See AM. BAR. ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  TREATMENT 
OF PRISONERS standard 23-11.3 (3d ed. 2010) (advocating external monitoring and 
inspection by independent agencies).  
68 See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1944-45 (2011) (upholding a lower court de-
cision requiring that the prison population be capped at 137.5% of design capacity). 
69 See Megan Comfort, Punishment Beyond the Legal Offender, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. 
SCI. 271, 280 (2007) (describing the disruption in a child’s upbringing that a mother’s 
imprisonment can cause); Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration & Social Inequali-
ty, DAEDALUS, Summer 2010, at 8, 8 (arguing that “mass incarceration . . . deepens 
disadvantage and forecloses mobility for the most marginal in society”). 
70 See State Policy Implementation Project, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www2.americanbar.org/ 
sections/criminaljustice/CR203800/Pages/statepolicyproject.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 
2012); see also Shima Baradaran, Op-Ed., The Right Way to Shrink Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 31, 2011, at A23 (recommending reforms to pretrial detention to reduce prison 
and jail overcrowding, as advocated by the ABA). 
71 State Policy Implementation Project, supra note 70. 
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